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Abstract:  
In a context of proliferating crises, from the environment to the economy, the politics 
and epistemology of “failure” – institutional, human, technological, environmental – is 
acquiring fresh relevance. Recent analyses in social studies of science and technology, 
as well as in political and economic sociology, have developed performative 
perspectives on this issue, and much of this work has focused on ‘market 
experiments.’ In this article, we suggest that these performative perspectives on market 
experiments suffer from some of the same shortcomings as market experiments 
themselves: they are biased towards success, and limited in their ability to 
acknowledge failure. Here, we seek to address this shortcoming by developing a three-
fold typology. Adopting an expansive notion of experiments in political economy, we 
argue that an adequate analysis requires further interrogation of the multifaceted nature 
of experimental failure, in particular of its alternatively restrictive and generative 
aspects. In order to explore the diverse, overlapping, and often paradoxical effects of 
experimental failures – such as the way that failures can both create and diminish 
opportunities to challenge the authority of existent political and economic frameworks 
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– we distinguish three types of failure: 1) entropic failure; 2) generative failure; and 3) 
performative failure.  
 
1. Introduction  
Disasters unfolding on various planes, from the environment to finance and the 
humanitarian, have raised questions about the capacities of predominant empirical 
knowledge regimes to identify systemic and other deep-rooted failures, and to provide 
the means to address them. Various allegedly unexpected crises have brought into 
relief the susceptibility of these regimes to co-optation by aspirational discourses, and 
pervasive commitments to ‘thinking positive, saying positive’, to use a phrase of the 
novelist Saunders (2001). From this vantage point, the inability to identify and own up 
to failure, in short, the inability to fail, presents a notable element in a wider complex 
problematic in which market democracies seem to become increasingly vulnerable to 
more or less irreparable failures, from climate change to the banking sector and the 
welfare state. In this article, we approach this problem by turning to experiments as a 
prevalent public form in contemporary market democracies, and the question of their 
capacity to fail.  
This question of experimental failure, we propose, is especially important given 
a further observation: perspectives on political economy that have recently been 
developed in the social sciences, namely performative ones, seem not very well 
equipped to acknowledge failure either. But the capacity to identify and affirm failure, 
we want to argue,  today seems especially critical to the efficacy of the empirical 
knowledge regimes in which liberal democracies are invested. However this issue of 
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experimental failure is precisely one  which currently prominent perspectives in 
economic and political sociology are in some respects not dealing with very well. 
 The issue of experimental failure is some respects an ‘old’ issue. Liberal or 
market democracies have long been characterized in terms of their commitment to 
experimental knowledge as a privileged form of public and political life (Ezrahi, 1990; 
Turner, 2003). There is a remarkable paradox here. On the one hand, what stands out 
about the 20th century commitment to experimentalism as a public form is precisely 
the affirmation of the corrigibility of failure, what some have called liberal 
democracies investment in problem-solving (Arendt, 1958; Wolin, 1960 (2004)) and 
others have termed fallibilism (Popper, 1963). Indeed, this affirmation of the 
corrigibility of specific failures is one way in which the concept of political, societal or 
environmental failure can be distinguished from the idea of crisis, which can only be 
addressed integrally. On the other hand, however, 20th century philosophy of science 
have precisely questioned the possibility to falsify experimental propositions (Duhem, 
1982 (1906)); Kuhn, 1996 (1962)). Transposing this insight into the realm of 
democratic politics, one could  say that experimentalism has its own momentum, as a 
public form that is enacted and re-enacted, in a ritualistic confirmation of the 
corrigibility of failure, something which only rarely in fact occurs.  
The issue of experimental failure has special salience in social and political 
theory today. Here, performative perspectives on economy and politics have risen to 
prominence, and these perspectives similarly display a preference for the experiment 
as a public form, and they, too, can be criticized for a ‘bias towards success’ (Miyazaki 
and Riles, 2005). We will present this critique in more detail below, and while we 
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agree with it, we will also argue that there is no easy way out of this conundrum, 
insofar as there is no end-point to performativity. The failures of experiments, and of 
empirical knowledge regimes more widely, then, are not exempt from the theory of 
performativity: the affirmation of failure, like everything else, requires performative 
investment. There is nothing ‘natural’ about failure, either. Especially in the 
contemporary context, this makes it all the more important to attend to failure, and we 
argue, to appreciate its multi-faceted nature. Thus, in this article we explore different 
forms, and normative capacities, of experimental failure: experimental failure may 
either engender opportunities for the mobilization of actors and articulation of claims 
or it may restrict avenues for contestations; and the attribution of failure to an 
experimental arrangement may either constrain or strengthen capacities for research 
and critical inquiry, on the part of social science, regulatory authorities, or ‘the actors 
themselves.’ Experimental failure, then, may have simultaneously or alternatively 
restrictive and generative aspects. 
To explore this last feature, we will consider a range of recent experiments in 
political economy, broadly conceived, in fields such as pharmaceuticals and 
sustainable technology, and on that basis, we will sketch a typology of experimental 
failure: 1) entropic failure; 2) generative failure and 3) performative failure. The first, 
‘entropic failure,’ explores the ways in which failed experiments rarely result in the 
delegitimization of their own effectiveness; on the contrary, failure serves to 
compound and solidify the authority of the individuals and institutions that presided 
over the failing arrangements to begin with. In these cases, failure is typically 
degenerative in its effects, leading to a sort of political decay or stalemate where the 
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answer to failing technologies or methodologies is an inevitable recourse to the same 
methods that precipitated problems in the first place. The second, ‘generative failure,’ 
approaches failure as a productive event, in which experiments provide opportunities 
for the demonstration of flaws and insufficiencies of the propositions and 
arrangements that they put to the test. Here experimental failure is conceived of as a 
moment of articulation, occasioning processes of the organisation of actors and the 
articulation of issues. Thirdly, and finally, we look at ‘performative failure,’ or the 
ways in which the characterization of a given politico-economic arrangement in 
experimental terms, may either limit or expand capacities for research and critical 
inquiry in relation to that arrangement.  
Distinguishing between types of failure, we feel, provides a way to begin to 
address the ‘inability to fail’ in the theory and practice of market experiments, for a 
number of reasons. To begin with, typology is a way of amplifying differences among 
aspects that may otherwise be conflated. Secondly, different types of experimental 
failure are likely to require different analytic and normative strategies on the part of 
social research and theory that seeks to address them. The aim of typology, then, is to 
provide some guidance as it which analytic and normative strategy is appropriate 
when. Relatedly, typology is also a way of ‘lightening’ the differences between 
various perspectives on public experiments developed in social theory: to make a 
typology is to approach different theories about experimental politics as identifying 
different aspects of similar phenomena. In particular, by making a typology we seek to 
bring two opposite approaches into relation with one another: social theories which 
take their cue from liberal theory, and those that specialize in the critique of liberalism. 
 6 
What is needed, we argue, is a move beyond the strict opposition between the liberal 
investment in experimentalism and its critique. We need a more fine-grained 
appreciation of different forms of political experimentalism. While this may be taken 
as an attempt to emphasise continuities, we end this article by stressing the importance 
of identifying the different conditions under which it becomes important to attend to 
the different aspects of experimental failure. 
 
 
2. Too performative to fail?  
Experiments have long been attributed special importance as a genre of public life in 
liberal democracy and in the liberal political economy. 20-century liberal thinkers 
from John Dewey to Karl Popper and Richard Rorty have celebrated experiments as 
offering the right attitude and format for doing knowledge, politics and ethics in 
modern societies. More recently, sociologists and historians of ‘scientific liberalism’ 
have directed attention to the experimental epistemology at the heart of liberal 
democracy (Ezrahi, 1990; Turner, 2003). In these accounts, liberal democracy does not 
just evince a strong commitment to the ‘empirical base’ of opinion-, decision-, and 
policy-making. Rather, the experimental form of knowledge-making is here elevated 
to a principal form for organising public life, through rituals of public inquiry and 
acccountability. Work in the social studies of science and technology, moreover, has 
attributed to experiments special affordances as devices of social, political and 
economic intervention. Work in this field has singled out scientific experiments and 
technological demonstrations as particularly effective means for the re-configuration 
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of social, political and economic relations, with examples ranging from the 19th 
century invention of the anthrax vaccine to the introduction of ultrasound technologies 
in the 20th  (Latour, 1993; Callon, 1986)  
Drawing on these earlier studies, recent performative approaches in economic 
sociology have equally singled out experiments as a crucial device for intervening in 
political economy. Experimental arrangements of knowledge and action, from 
consumer preference research to carbon emissions trading schemes, are signalled for 
providing particular clear instantiations of the performatist argument: the point that 
“forms of knowledge enact their objects, or help to render them explicit” (Muniesa et 
al, 2007; p. 5). Market experiments here figure as a sub-set of the broader category of 
market devices, whose merit it is to provide concrete (or explicit) instantiations of 
performatism. In experimental arrangments, the deployment of scientific knowledge 
and empirical technologies ostensibly and visibly plays a role in the organisation of 
markets. In these cases, the sciences and devices of experimental economics, 
accounting, marketing, and so on, are clearly identifiable as a means for extending 
markets, the rendering transferable and thus tradable of more or less virtual goods, and 
the organisation of market actors in the process (Beunza and Stark, 2002; Lezaun, 
2007; Muniesa and Callon, 2007; MacKenzie, 2009). 
The performative perspectives developed in the social studies of markets have 
recently been criticized for ascribing a certain efficacy to economic mechanisms 
(Miyazaki and Riles, 2005; Arena, 2010; see also Didier, 2009). Thus, Hirokazu 
Miyazaki and Annelise Riles (2005) suggest that what is most distinctive about 
performative perspectives in the social studies of finance and economics is their 
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commitment to account for the ways in which economic knowledge and political 
economic mechanisms work, as opposed to critical programmes in economic sociology 
that preceded it, and which sought to demonstrate their limits and flaws. This 
‘affirmative’ effect of performative perspectives in economic sociology can also be 
recognized in relation to experimental arrangements. For example, in the essay 
‘Civilizing Markets: Carbon trading between in vitro and in vivo experiments,’ Michel 
Callon has noted how the European carbon market has been explicitly termed ‘an 
experiment’ by the actors involved, i.e. the EU, and he endorses this definition insofar 
as it brings into view a particular dynamic of market formation: “Mechanisms are set 
up to identify the effects produced, the bugs encountered, and the reactions triggered, 
so that they can be taken into account and the architecture of the markets under 
experimentation altered” (Callon, 2009).  
One of the things that sets an experimental understanding of markets apart from 
a non-experimental one, according to Callon, is that the former conceives of critiques 
and ‘problematizations’ of market arrangements as part of - and indeed partly 
constitutive of - the process of market formation. This, in turn, implies three further 
characterizations of markets: 1) by defining markets as experiments, market formation 
may appear to be rather like scientific research; 2) defining markets as experiments 
allows for an inclusive definition of the market; it includes the range of actors across 
science, civil society and so on, thus dissolving the distinction between market actors 
and stakeholders; and 3) an experimental conception of the market helps to encourage 
a particularly flexible and mutable understanding of their effectiveness, one that is 
open to seeing “market failures” as constitutive of new opportunities and 
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entanglements, rather than merely dismissible as evidence of faulty planning or corrupt 
behaviour. As Callon put it: “the design process must necessarily consist of a long 
process of trial and error,” something that militates against purely negative 
specifications of market dysfunction. In this respect, we suggest that experimental 
conceptions of market devices in particular evince the complication noted by Riles and 
Miyazaki, namely that such perspectives are biased towards the success of markets, 
rather than their failure. 
The preoccupation with the efficacy of market instruments has been 
problematised in various ways. Miyazaki and Riles emphasise its limitations as an 
ethnographic project. They note that a socio-technical focus on how the market works 
“celebrates …the mystique of finance.” As such, they note, “it drowns out the 
currently dominant mode of apprehension of the market among participants [..] 
[namely] a shared perception of failure” (p. 320; see also Arena 2010). One could add 
that a preoccupation with the efficacy of market instruments risks forgetting other 
analytic insights of ‘performative’ studies from the field of STS. Thus, we can note 
how ‘a bias towards the efficacy’ of economic instruments resonates with earlier 
criticisms levelled against performative perspectives developed in actor-network 
theory, in particular – namely their investment in the capacity of science and 
technology to ‘change the world,’ never mind the imperialist ramifications, and their 
lack of attention to all the ways in which science and technology have proved 
impressively ineffective as instruments of social, political and moral reconfiguration 
(Haraway, 1994; Leigh Star, 1991; Mol, 2002). In the context of political economy, 
the performatist ‘bias towards success’ might be seen to contribute to an effect that 
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Fran Tonkiss (2008) terms capitalocentrism – the overstating of the extension of 
capitalist mechanisms and their hold on the economy overall.1  
Furthermore, the issue of the experimental bias towards success also harks back 
to earlier debates in the philosophy of science, with the holistic approach of Pierre 
Duhem presenting one notable point of return. Pierre Duhem defined what we can 
retrospectively term ‘the problem of experimental failure’: when criteria of 
experimental success are not met, it is impossible to determine conclusively whether 
this ‘failure’ should be attributed to either the experimental set-up; the theoretical 
framework, or the empirical proposition under scrutiny itself. In making this argument, 
Duhem suggested that experimental failure is under-determined by the experimental 
apparatus. One could say that, in doing so, he brought experimental failure within the 
realm of the constructed and the performed. Experimental failure, as much as success, 
is then subject to interpretative flexibility (the term is Bijker & Pinch’s, 1984); 
experimental results may be interpreted in a variety of ways which are never fully 
constrained or commanded by the experimental arrangements themselves. From 
Duhem onwards, philosophers and sociologists of science and technology, have 
elaborated on the ways in which failure is inevitability and unavoidably a matter of 
interpretation, construction and performance (Kuhn, 1996 (1962); Latour, 1996; 
Miyazaki and Riles, 2005). Indeed, performative perspectives on market arrangements 
developed by the ‘new’ economic sociology can be said to reflect the Duhemian 
argument about the constructed nature of ‘experimental results,’ extending it to the 
                                            
1 It is a simple, effective argument: capitalism conventionally is understood as a total, and 
dominant, economic system, but a great deal of most people’s economic lives are spent in 
non-capitalist activities in the public or non-profit sectors, in cooperatives and mutuals, in the 
home, in caring, self-provisioning, swapping, barter, doing favours, theft, cadging and so on 
(Tonkiss,  2008; Gibson-Graham, 2006).  
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analysis of politico-economic arrangements. What we would like to highlight is that 
these perspectives are in danger of replicating the very bias towards success which 
Duhem sought to highlight. 
The continuities between Duhem and currently fashionable performative 
perspectives on political economy also indicate that there may be deeply buried 
assumptions contributing to the privileging of success in the latter. Indeed, it should be 
noted that some authors associated with the performative approach in economic 
sociology have proposed that we speak not so much of public experiments but of 
‘public demonstrations’ (Barry, 2001; Girard and Stark, 2007). Experimental 
arrangements today frequently play a promotional role (Thrift and French, 2002). And 
as experiments function not so much as critical trials but rather as publicity devices, 
the possibility of their failure seems to move beyond the horizon. In the following 
sections, we wish to take seriously the possibility of experiments to fail, while also 
taking into account the various problematisations of experimental failure discussed 
above. We will do this by focusing on the ways in which experimental devices can be 
ascribed the capacity to organise political economies, without this capacity being 
predicated on the efficacy of these instruments. Thus we consider failure as one 
significant aspect of the ability or inability of experiments to ‘intervene’ in social, 
political and economic relations. We propose to do so through a typology of failure 
which we develop below in a discussion of a number of case studies of politico-
economic experiments, broadly conceived. 
 
3. Entropic Failure  
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In spring 2010, the New Yorker and the Atlantic ran remarkably similar profiles of 
Timothy Geithner, the US Treasury Secretary. The articles – “Inside Man,” in the 
Atlantic and “No Credit,” in the New Yorker – are similar in their tone and their 
findings, generally praising Geithner’s strategy for improving economic stability in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis, suggesting his plan has been more effective and less 
expensive than anyone predicted at the outset of the crisis  (Cassidy 2010; Green 
2010).  
Something notable about both articles is that they contain little of the criticism 
that first plagued Geithner’s appointment over a year earlier, when many commented 
that due to Geithner’s previous positions – such as serving from 2003 to 2009 as the 
president of the New York Federal Reserve, during a time when calls for stricter 
regulation of the derivatives market were generally deflected or mitigated under his 
supervision – he might not be the best individual to amend a system he thrived within. 
Noam Chomsky summarized the tenor of concern during an interview on the US 
public radio programme Democracy Now in April 2009: “The current Obama-Geithner 
plan is not very different from the Bush-Paulson plan. I mean, somewhat different, but 
circumstances have changed…it’s still based on the principle that we have to – 
somehow, the taxpayer has to rescue the institutions intact. They have to remain intact, 
including the people who, you know, destroyed the economy. In fact, they are the ones 
who Obama picked to fix it.” Chomsky suggested that rather than receiving 
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government appointments, most of the individuals selected as Obama’s advisors 
“should be getting subpoenas.”2  
In June 2009, the US treasury published a plan for a number of financial 
reforms, largely orchestrated by Geithner. Key components of the plan, as Joshua 
Green describes, include imposing constraints on the leverage firms can use; the 
establishment of a clearinghouse for derivatives, which would subject the instruments 
to marginally more oversight, and creating more tools for shareholders to express 
criticism of executive remuneration – but not to interfere with or limit executive pay or 
bonuses. Most striking about the reforms was their adeptness at leaving largely 
unaltered the “two worlds Geithner knows best, Wall Street and Washington” (Green 
2010). 
The 2009 economic reforms represent something like an extreme caricature of 
an insight that emerges from Michael Power’s work on failed systems of audit and 
regulation, where he notes that a curious feature of failed systems of audit and risk 
management is how rarely they call into their question own legitimacy. The solution to 
failed audits is typically more audits, rendering systems of audits most impervious to 
change at the very point when individuals speak of their widespread ineffectiveness. 
As Power writes: 
 
The great puzzle of financial audit is that is has never been a more powerful and 
influential model of administrative control than now, when many commentators 
talk of an auditing crisis. Accordingly, I suggest that the audit explosion shares 
                                            
2   Noam Chomsky on the Global Economic Crisis, Healthcare, US Foreign Policy and Resistance to American 
Empire. Democracy Now, April 13, 2009. See 
http://www.democracynow.org/2009/4/13/noam_chomsky_on_the_global_economic. 
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an important character with all kinds of policing:  all have problematic criteria 
of success and are generally only publicly visible when they are seen to fail. 
But failure generally leads to a call for more policing and only rarely for a 
thorough analysis of why policing is failing (Power 1994: 7; 2007). 
  
Even when the gravity of a crisis provokes attention to problems of “systemic risk,” or 
leads to calls for radical regulatory change, the very explicitness of the failure tends to 
strengthen demands for more of the same tools of audit or risk management which 
proved ineffective at an earlier stage, resources which are typically mobilized by those 
who have been, perversely, most implicated in causing the crisis. We suggest the 
example of Geithner represents an “extreme caricature” because Geithner’s very 
public limitations at reshaping the regulatory arenas he thrived at keeping intact helps 
to illuminate both the banality and the pervasiveness of the phenomenon we are 
describing: everyone knows that crisis situations often tend to benefit perpetrators at 
the expense of witnesses or victims; the surprise is that so many observers, at the 
outset of 2007 crisis, assumed that the sheer magnitude of events might enable things 
to be different this time.  
In fact, the reverse is often true. The larger the crisis, the more elusive 
architectural, systematic change typically becomes. An irony of the ongoing crisis is 
that, first, calls for pouring resources into improving systems of risk detection and 
management are always greater the worse the problem becomes – systems of risk 
management thrive most when they appear to fail – and second, the very magnitude of 
the crisis has rendered accountability difficult for any one particular party. Both the 
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severity of the crisis and the scale of the crisis have compounded the difficulty of 
finding solutions that do not simply augment the authority and power of the crisis’s 
main instigators. The very severity of the crisis renders it difficult to propose alternate 
arrangements that might exacerbate instability – radical measures are deemed too risky 
for desperate times; the practical space for alternative arrangements, to reiterate 
Power’s point, is weakened at the very moment when the rhetorical demand for novel 
measures reaches a more feverous pitch (see also McGoey 2007; 2010).  
We term this tendency “entropic failure,” our phrase for the sort of paralysis 
that occurs when the answer to a failed technology or methodological approach is an 
inevitable recourse to the same methods that led to problems in the first place, 
consolidating the authority of those who precipitated failures. Entropic failure is 
cyclical and self-reinforcing: the answer to failed technologies is typically more of 
them, and need for better technological solutions increases proportionately with the 
gravity of the deficiencies of earlier technologies. Failed technologies tend to triumph 
even as they appear to lose legitimacy, if only because the fallibility of earlier models 
or methodologies cements the need for more resources to remedy the shortcomings of 
earlier efforts.  
The phrase entropic failure draws on the scientific definition on entropy, a term 
stemming from physics and defined as “a quantitative measure of the amount of 
thermal energy not available to do work” (our italics), something that can lead to 
“inevitable and steady deterioration of a system or a society.”3 Our use of the term 
                                            
3 Dictionary.com, "entropic," in The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition. 
Source location: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2004. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/entropic. Available: 
http://dictionary.reference.com. Accessed: February 26, 2010. 
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seeks to illuminate the ways that failure can deplete and limit the resources and energy 
available for others to seek out or defend alternative visions or experiments; entropic 
failure leads to a sort of systematic atrophy of opportunities. Situations seemingly 
marked by the intensity of their apparent chaos or volatility, such as the recent 
volatility of global markets, act as a sort of mirage, camouflaging the ways that new 
opportunities tend to stagnate as a result of volatility rather than expand.    
 Even solutions that appear to implement or to articulate alternative measures 
tend to reflect a “consensus in dissensus,” where ostensible conflict over how to 
remedy or ameliorate a situation serves to compound the assumption that a situation 
must be saved, or is worth saving. An example can be seen in Bourdieu’s analysis of 
the Barthes-Picard Affair in France, where he analyzes Roland Barthes and Raymond 
Picard’s public dispute over their differing interpretations of Racinian tragedy. Despite 
their apparent conflict, a shared faith of both scholars was their belief in the value of 
studying classical French thinkers such as Racine, compounding the inability of 
suggesting such a pursuit might itself be open to question. Thus “behind their apparent 
dispute lay a certain ‘complicity,’ ‘the consensus in dissensus’ which forms the unity 
of the intellectual field” (Bourdieu 1969; Lane 2000: 73).  
 
3. Generative failures  
There is also another type of failed experiment, namely one in which failure can be 
ascribed generative capacities, insofar as it provides an occasion for the articulation of 
issues and the mobilization of actors. This notion of productive failure can be traced 
back to arguments in 20th- philosophy and sociology which  propose to appreciate ‘the 
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break down of taken-for-granted assumptions as an occasion for learning.  (Dewey, 
1998 (1908); Garfinkel, 1967; Callon, 1983; Latour, 1987, Woolgar, 2005). According 
to these arguments, the ostensible refusal of actors or entities to perform according to 
expectations provides a moment in which situations, objects or relations are rendered 
legible, and may become subject to inquiry, debate or intervention. Importantly, 
experimental arrangements have been singled out as uniquely equipped to facilitate 
this kind of generative failure, as in the case of the scientific laboratories studied by 
actor-network theorists, or the ‘breaching experiments’ of ethnomethodology (see 
Marres, 2012). Useful as they are, however, these sociological accounts have often 
shied away from addressing the political efficacy of experimental failure, something 
which has been usefully highlighted in the work of the pragmatist philosopher John 
Dewey, and contemporary adherents of his philosophy.4   
As mentioned in the first section, John Dewey is a champion of experimentalism, 
and in his theory of state he posits experimental failure as an important formative 
dynamic of political and wider societal change. This has recently been highlighted by 
authors seeking to extend performatist perspectives to political sociology (Dratwa, 
2005; Latour, 2001; Lindhardt, 2008; see also Marres, 2005), who return to Dewey’s 
classic The Public and Its Problems (1991 [1927]) to find conceptual support for this 
                                            
4 Dewey’s work is especially interesting in the context of this paper, because social studies of economies often 
appeal to precisely his philosophy as an important source of inspiration (Muniesa, 2007; Callon, 2009).  
Where the performative sociology of markets tends to present Dewey as an percursor of instrumentalist 
strategies focused on ‘problem-solving’, we are arguing that Dewey’s work also highlights an alternative 
political tactic, namely post-instrumentalist practices of issue formation. The concept of generative failure is key 
to his formulation of this second strategy.  However, it should be noted that this concept can also be recognized 
in other sources, such as Machiavelli’s Prince, where, as J.G.A. Pocock (2003 (1975)) points out, the dissolution 
or failure of working customs, traditions and routines, is recognized as a crucial condition for political 
innovation. In The Prince, the prime moment of politics is not when legitimacy is achieved, but when it is 
suspended. And from this perspective, the notion of legitimacy is not associated with a long-awaited, much 
desired proper order. It applies instead to those situations in which custom and tradition prove sufficient in going 
about business, government, and life in general, and which are relatively uninteresting as far as politics is 
concerned (see Marres, 2005).  
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project. In a famous passage, Dewey argues that the possibility for state institutions to 
fail is not only critical to their renewal, but constitutes an important occasion and pre-
condition for the kind of political mobilization that institutional change is likely to 
require: 
 
The formation of states must be an experimental process. The trial process may 
go on with diverse degrees of blindness and accident, and at the cost of 
unregulated procedures of cut and try, of fumbling and groping, without insight 
into what men are after or clear knowledge of a good state (34) even when it is 
achieved. Or it may proceed more intelligently, because guided by knowledge of 
the conditions which must be fulfilled. But it is still experimental. And since 
conditions of action and of inquiry and knowledge are always changing, the 
experiment must always be retried; the State must always be rediscovered. 
      Dewey, the Public and its Problems, p. 16 
 
What is crucial for our purposes here is that Dewey’s concept of experimental 
failure, while embracing the experimental nature of political change, at the same time 
makes room for failure. Dewey, in other words, does not make the narrow, empiricist 
assumption that experimental failure, if it occurs, can be readily identifiable and thus 
addressed. One could say, that Dewey’s notion already incorporates and responds to 
the holistic critique of experimentail failure, such as the one developed by Duhem 
discussed above.. In this respect, Dewey’s notion of experimental failure can be 
distinguished from what we could call the ‘meliorist’ understanding of it. The latter 
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would view the identification of failure by experimental means as a first step in an 
organisational process of problem-solving, but Dewey’s theory of the state can be seen 
to posit an alternative to this basic idea. He argues that institutional failures tend to go 
unnoticed: to render institutional failures perceptible, he notes, requires that “we break 
with existing institutional forms” (Dewey, 1991 [1927]: 30–31). What distinguishes a 
Deweyian notion of failure from other varieties is that it can not readily be fitted into 
existing procedures of knowledge- and decision-making. It is not easily remediable or 
corrigible – and that is part of its political efficacy (see Marres, 2005).  Dewey, then, 
suggests a distinction between what could be called ‘procedural empiricism,’ in which 
failure is principally an occasion to engage in an organisational processes of problem-
solving, and a more radical empiricism, in which failure figures as an occasion for a 
much wider and varied process of mobilization and articulation. Here, we want explore 
this distinction through an empirical case, namely sustainable living experiments, 
which facilitate the performance of experimental failure in these different ways. 
The template of the ‘sustainable living experiment’ is today deployed by a broad 
range of agencies, in government, media, activism, business, science and art, for a 
variety of purposes. The genre is perhaps most strongly associated with (counter-
)cultural movements committed to bringing about simpler and more ‘natural; modes of 
living by social, technical and material means, from changing basic everyday habits to 
architectural interventions (Marres, 2012). However, recently the label of the 
sustainable living experiment has also been taken up by agencies in industry and 
government as part of their attempts to incorporate environmental concerns and 
measures into services, products and policies (Lovell, 2007; Karvonen and More, 
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2008). The term has been claimed as a label for  demonstrational projects in the 
housing sector, one example being the ‘Ecohome’ project administered by the London 
Council of Camden in collaboration with University College London, the construction 
company Kingspan, and the NGO English Heritage. In this project, which involved the 
refurbishment of a Victorian social housing project to a high standard of sustainable 
energy use, the experimental status of theinitiative was quite dramatically proclaimed. 
A press release, for example, pitches the Camden Ecohome as “a ground-breaking 
experiment to reduce carbon emissions whilst addressing heritage issues.”5  While the 
label of ‘experiment’  in these cases clearlyserves a publicity purpose, this is not to say 
that there is no substance to the claim. In sustainable living experiments, the claim to 
‘experimentality’ tends to be matched by an intense reliance on empirical devices to 
measure environmental performance. Thus, the CamdenEcohome was equipped with 
various sensors and meters to monitor the building as well as the energy practices of 
its inhabitants. Such devices are, in other words, technically and not merely nominally 
experimental arrangements.  
The sustainable living experiment can be called a multifaceted experimental 
device, insofar as it takes different forms and is put to different purposes depending on 
the case. We would like to argue that the very adaptability and variability of this 
experimental form is key to understanding its generative potential, including the 
generative potential of its failures. To make this argument is to go against the 
understanding of sustainable living experiments as ‘merely’ promotional or 
demonstrational devices. According to such an understanding, the principal merit of 
the experiment as a genre of publicity is that it enables the wider circulation of a new 
                                            
5 http://www.carbon-innovation.com/discussion/viewtopic.php?t=512 
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proposition, device or product. Applying such a perspective to sustainable living 
experiments, they would have to be defined as instruments for enabling the circulation 
of empirical technologies for environmental performance, from smart electricity 
meters to carbon accounting software, and thus, for preparing the ground for an 
economy of ‘environmental performance.’ Such an analysis would place sustainable 
living experiments ‘beyond success or failure’: whether or not these experiments fail 
or succeed qua living experiments, or even whether these devices actually work in 
practice, here becomes, to an extent, immaterial. What matters is the circulation of 
experimental forms and devices as such. Here we want to counter this reductionist 
interpretation of experiments, and insist that sustainable living experiments are very 
much capable of failure, and that this represents a crucial feature of this public form. 
Experimental enactments of failure may serve to make the case for action or attention 
to a particular area.  
To provide an example of this politically generative deployment of 
experimental failure, public tours of sustainable showhomes often include a moment in 
which the tour guide pauses dramatically at an idle renewable energy source. In the 
case of the Camden Ecohome, the tour brought us to  a biomass boiler which was 
wrongly installed, and a little while later, to a at  defunct smart meter provided by EDF 
that wouldn’t work in combination with said boiler.6 Such moments provide occasions 
for some hilarity, as well as for more comprehensive claims, such as the remark that ‘a 
boiler is only as good as the plumbers that service it,’ an observation which shifts 
attention from technology to issues of skills and employment. . In some cases, such 
                                            
6 Similarly, sustainable living blogs provide catalogues of less drastic but not dissimilar interventions that proved 
unworkable – from having the “wrong” house for a wind turbine to the discontinuation of a bus services which 
made it “impossible” not to take the car (Marres, 2009). 
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performances of failures fit the category of the ‘tactical failure’ which has long been 
recognized as characteristic of the empirical mode of presentation. As pointed out by 
Shapin and Shaffer’s study of the emergence of modern scientific experimentation in 
17th century England, drawing attention to the failures or flaws of experiments is a key 
rhetorical strategy in building legitimacy for these experiments  (Shapin and Shaffer, 
1989). Such tactical demonstration of failure can be recognized in experimental 
moments like the above. More generally, the tactical demonstration of failure seems to 
be a principal objective of sustainable living experiments undertaken by NGOs and 
activists. 
This was the justification given by the coordinator of the Hackney-Islington 
Carbon Action Rationing Group, a community platform for experiments in personal 
carbon trading, for engaging in this undertaking. He proposed that one of the main 
objectives of this initiative is to draw attention to the fact that governments and 
institutions are not putting in place similar measures for the reduction of CO2 
emissions. In his account, he demonstration that everyday people are capable of living 
within an ‘carbon budget’, as narrated on the groups website and reported in news 
media from the Guardian to the International Herald Tribune, served to highlight the 
ways in which governments and industry, in spite of their commitments and available 
resources, had not accomplished this (John Ackers, personal communication). The 
demonstration of institutional failure, one could say, here becomes the ‘performative 
objective’ of social experimentation.7 Besides enacting institutional failure, carbon 
                                            
7 This example also usefully illustrates that living experiments do not necessarily involve the displacement of 
responsibility to individual citizens, something for which “DIY concepts” of environmental engagement are 
sometimes criticized , and which is well summarized by the Guardian headline, advertising a “green your home” 
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rationing experiments also generated wider opportunities for political mobilization 
around issues of  climate change. This initiative can be understood as an 
‘experimental’ adaptation of the predominant politico-economic formula of carbon 
accounting: it is community-based rather than industry-driven, and the reports it 
generates concentrate on how bearable (or not) it is to take into account the 
environmental costs of mundane action, rather than on securing the profitability of 
substainability measures.  
The experimental performance of institutional failure, then, is generative in that 
it provides occasions for the articulation of issues and the mobilization of actors. By 
virtue of the adaptability of the format of the, sustainable living experiments, the 
above initiatives could develop and advocate alternative configurations of a political 
economy of carbon accounting. In these cases, experiments are clearly capable of 
much more than the mere demonstration or reinforcement of a pre-existing proposition 
or ideology, for instance the doctrine that markets can solve the environmental crisis 
wrought by climate change. Instead, the experimental form here makes possible the 
generation of contending articulations of the ‘carbon economy,’ from a municipal 
agenda of addressing global environmental issues through the transformation of 
municipal social housing arrangements, to a mundane ethics of living well. (Which is 
also to say, neither do experiments here offer only a negative critique of dominant 
enactments of the carbon economy: they enact positive alternatives). However, the 
question remains whether and how this generative capacity of experiments may come 
to be more widely recognized. And this brings us to the question of performative 
                                                                                                                                        
special in the week after the Climate summit in December 2009: “The politicians failed in Copenhagen, so now 
it is up to you.”  
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failure: the extent to which research and inquiry may either limit or strengthen the 
political efficacy of experimental failures. 
 
4. Performative Failure 
The previous sections have focused on the epistemological, political and social 
consequences that ensue when experimental politico-economic arrangements fail, or 
are enacted as such, from arrangements of financial regulation to sustainable living. 
 In this section, we turn our gaze to examine another type of failure – the risk that 
‘experimentalist’ modes of inquiry, adopted in the social sciences, fail to critically 
interrogate the arrangements defined in those terms. The characterization of a given 
[market] arrangement as experimental in nature, by sociologists and other analysts, 
itself may have political, epistemic and social effects. Our question then is whether 
and how the investment of analysts in labelling or ‘performing’ a given political 
economic arrangement as experimental, expands or limits capacities for inquiry and 
critique in relation to that arrangement. A related question, one that we flagged in the 
first section, is whether performative perspectives on experiments in political 
economy, more specifically, are especially vulnerable to this kind of failure. As we 
suggested there, performative theories may seem difficult to prove wrong; to ascribe 
the capacity to perform certain entitites or even realities to particular devices suggests 
that these devices work, and that performativity works, but on what grounds is not 
always clear. Performative perspectives are at risk of remaining impervious to their 
own failure, something which since Popper’s (1963) critique of infallible knowledge 
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raises the question of its political and normative implications, and how these might be 
addressed.  
Performative perspectives in economic sociology, we suggested, are highly 
assymetric, in that they tend to privilege the question of the efficacy of markets over 
that of how these arrangements fail. However, here we would like to address the more 
specific issue of whether and how, by defining arrangements as ‘experimental’, the 
analysis sets limits on how they may fail, on which types of failures will be considered 
and which won’t. Do experimental perspectives exclude particular modes of 
(experimental) failure from their analysis,, such as the wholesale ‘failure’ of market 
arrangements as such; or their faltering on non-technical, more ephemeral or 
disorderly grounds?  
This possibility has been suggested recently by Judith Butler (2010), who 
proposes that theorists such as Callon have failed to realize the extent to which 
performativity itself is dependent on its own failure in order to thrive. As she writes, 
“performativity never fully achieves its effect, and so in this sense ‘fails’ all the time; 
its failure is what necessitates its reiterative temporality, and we cannot think 
iterability without failure” (Butler 2010: 153; see also Cochoy et al 2010). 
Performativity flourishes through indefinitely extending and deflecting the criterion of 
its own success: if an utterance or perfomative action fails to produce a desired effect, 
the solution is to reiterate the utterance. Just as audits and failed RCTs are 
strengthened through their own ineffectiveness, performative operations function 
through failing to achieve the results they aspire to. They are limitlessly able to profit 
from their own inefficiencies, much like the “ideal of financial speculation” touted by 
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those responsible for the recent financial crisis is a mode of speculation that “can only 
increase possibilities for profit but never break down in the face of an external limit” 
(Butler 2010: 153).  
This point leads to Butler’s overarching concern with performativity as it has 
been framed by economic sociologists: their inability or refusal to think through the 
value of particular performative actions. Rather than merely ask how economic actions 
are made, or how certain effects are instituted, she maintains that we need to 
reintroduce normative questions into the theory of perfomativity, examining not 
simply whether operations of performativity succeed or fail, but whether they ought to 
have succeeded or not (Butler 2010: 154).  
To be sure, some of Butler’s concerns have been considered by the very 
theorists she suggests have neglected them. For one, it would be implausible to suggest 
that performative perspectives in economic sociology are narrowly instrumental or 
positivist in their orientation, concentrating on the how and ignoring the why. Neither 
can these perspectives be called technocratic, as if they would only allow for technical 
failure, but not for moral or political ones. The performative concept of the ‘market 
experiment’, such as that adopted by Callon, precisely rejects any neat division 
between between the ‘falsifiable’ ‘empirical content’ of market devices and 
experiments and the more fundamental, or ‘transcendental’ framing assumptions, and 
implies a critique of the distinction between their economic or technical and their 
moral or political aspects. (We could say that this is the Duhemian legacy traceable in 
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the concept of experimental markets.8) The performative sociology of markets 
precisely offers an alternative to the distinction between instrumental problem-solving 
within the frame of the market, and a transcendental critique that stands outside it. 
Rejecting any neat distinction between the inside and outside, the content and context, 
of market experiments, these perspectives propose that the problematization of market 
arrangements - the objections, bugs, challenges, critiques, or ‘issuefications’ (Marres 
and Rogers, 2008) - are likely to be at once technical, moral and political, and are  part 
of the experiments called markets.  
The performative definition of the market as a platform of problematization, 
then, internalizes the enactment of accountability, controversy and critique by 
regulatory agencies, NGOs and social movements, in an inclusive conception of 
‘performing post-market arrangements.’ However, Callon’s framing of post-market 
arrangements in experimental terms can nevertheless be seen to exclude consideration 
of certain modes of failure. Take, for example, “Civilizing Markets,” the title of his 
recent exploration of carbon markets. At first glance, this title brings to mind Albert 
Hirschman’s discussion in The Passions and the Interests of the way that moral 
acceptance and regard for capitalist markets first grew out of the hope, generated in the 
17th and 18th centuries, that markets might tame the volatility of political states 
exacerbating political instability and conflict due to a blind focus on national self-
interest over pursing collective economic stability. Modern capitalism emerged as an 
antidote to modern political strife (see Miller 2009, Hirschman 2003, Fourcade and 
Healy 2007). But Hirschman is not mentioned in Callon’s piece; there is little explicit 
                                            
8 In this respect, the performatist analysis of market experiments does not fit with a classic liberal democratic 
epistemology according to which empirical forms of accountability validate the idea that   problem-solving by 
experts is the   central operating dynamic of democracy .  
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discussion of moral and political problematizations of markets in social and political 
theory in his own account, even as he includes these kinds of problematization in his 
empirical definition of markets. Could we say that critique is here empiricised to the 
point that it comes to resemble problem-solving? Does a belief in ‘market meliorism’ 
risk reinstating the very distinction between instrumental and transcendental 
perspectives on the market which performative perspectives precisely sought to 
complicate? 
 Rather than finding a definitive answer to this question, it seems more 
important to note the performative phenomenon of labelling (Hacking, 2004) that may 
be at work here. Calling an arrangement ‘experimental’ may have the effect of 
legitimating or strengthening the reality of that arrangement. This phenomenon is 
especially important to consider insofar as it can be extended well beyond sociology. It 
may be applied to social and economic commentators on ‘market experiments’ much 
more widely, in policy, media and the non-governmental sector. One can think here of 
aforementioned framing of domestic carbon accounting – which involves the 
introduction of a mode of regulatory control and economic valuation into the 
household - as an ‘experiment in sustainable living’. This experimental form has been 
deployed to put predominant framings and enactments of the carbon economy on trial, 
but it has also been taken up as a way of promoting carbon economy uncritically. This 
is how a report on another UK experiments in carbon accounting by the Oxford 
Environmental Change Institute, called Trialling Carbon Allowances, justified 
experiments in personal carbon accounting: 
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‘..the use of pilots has been more akin to prototyping than to experimentation..’ 
and that ‘..the piloting process is not so much about experimenting as about 
exemplifying..’. If exemplifying is an important part of policy adoption, then it 
is hard to see how PCA could be adopted in the absence of trial studies (Fawcett 
et al, 2008).  
 
The sociology of public demonstrations (Giraud & Stark, 2007; Barry, 2001) has 
discussed the cross-over of the experiment into a promotional demonstration. But these 
cross-overs can also be taken as a reminder that experiments can defined or labelled in 
very different ways, as either critical trials or promotional devices. The definition of 
experiments as devices of problematization is likely to require a critical intervention 
on the part of social science. 
 That is, we would like to end this section by considering the implications of our 
argument for the roles that social research may play in relation to experimental 
arrangements. If it is indeed the case that experiments are ‘under-determined’ 
arrangements, in the sense proposed by Duhem, then it may be possible for social 
science to help determine these arrangements. In studying experiments, social science 
adds its trace; it can produce variable articulations of these experiments like other 
practices. This is crucial in view of precisely the under-determinacy of experimental 
failures. In this context, generative failures may easily go unnoticed and be ignored at 
the expense of promotional versions of experiments. It must then be the job of social 
science to attend to these dynamics of failure, both the generative and the entropic 
ones, and foreground these. Which is also to say, the job of performative sociology 
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must go further than that of the explication of sub-political mechanisms, i.e. the ways 
in which the functioning of market devices produces seemingly technical but latently 
political effects (see MacKenzie 2009).  
Performative sociology has a role to play in the analysis and dramatization not 
only of the technical mechanisms but of their failures in the political, moral and 
technical sense. And this would have to involve a readiness to explore how far it is 
possible to extend performative perspectives beyond a narrow focus on experimental 
arrangements in their technical aspect. To allude to a recent article by Peter Miller 
(2009), drawing on work by Hirschman, we need to examine the consequences of the 
fluid ways in which ‘private vices’ may have been mistaken for ‘technical 
accomplishments’, and to the ease with which ‘experimental failure’ could be 
translated into personal gain. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The attraction of an experimental concept of failure, we have suggested, is that it 
allows us to acknowledge that experiments in political economy may result in failure 
in a range of different ways. Performative perspectives on markets emphasise the 
experimental nature of these arrangements, but, as it turns out, these approaches have a 
‘problem’ with failure as much as realist, systemic theories of economic crisis do. 
These perspectives are not very good either at appreciating incidental or contigent 
failures, as performative analyses of the role of experimental devices in the enactment 
of political economy are biased towards success. Whereas crisis theory suggests that 
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only entire systems can truly fail, the performative sociology of markets presents 
failure as eminently corrigible, to the point that it does look much like failure at all. 
In this paper, we have sought to address some of the limitations of performative 
perspectives by developing a typology that highlights different ways in which market 
experiments may result in technical failure, regulatory failure, and political failure. To 
adopt such an approach is to say that we must be more experimental than the 
performative sociology of markets: we must recognize that the failure of market 
experiments may take many different forms, and may have very different political and 
social implications, and therefore may require very different analytic and normative 
strategies on the part of analysts.9 While entropic failure invites us to consider 
dynamics of the consolidation of authority, generative failure alerts us to normatively 
productive dynamics of articulation, in which the organisation of novel alliances and 
issues is the main event. Performative failure, finally, requires us to attend to the 
normative implications of the designation of initiatives in political economy as (failed) 
market experiments, by social scientists and other analysts. 
Such a typology builds upon and nuances the performative assertion that 
sociology must move beyond the narrow opposition between instrumental 
endorsements and transcendental critiques of the market. Our three-fold topology, we 
hope, provides some suggestions as to how to refuse the choice between these two: 
between either narrow empirical analyses of markets as instruments of problem-
solving, or wholesale critiques of the market as an ideological regime that cannot be 
falsified in practice. This is not because we think it is possible to provide a ‘neutral’ 
                                            
9 This entails an conception of sociology as an a posteriori forms of analysis (Lash 2009). 
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account of market experiments. Rather, different type of market experiments and their 
failures require different modes of empirical and normative analysis. Whereas the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis compelled an analysis of entropic failure, 
sustainable living experiments invite an account of generative failure. We suggest that 
this typology helps to chart a new avenue for avoiding an entrenchment of the 
opposition between instrumental endorsement and transcendental critique of markets, 
one that can be distinguished from earlier performative accounts of markets. Rather 
than a narrow preoccupation with the devices of the market, or fawning rhapsodies 
over their technical workings, we suggest that what is required is a more nuanced 
sense of the different types of political experimentalism at work in contemporary 
political economy. 
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